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ARGUMENT
In Utah Code Section 34A~2-413(l)(c), the Legislature sets forth four criteria to be
considered by the Labor Commission in determining whether or not an applicant is
permanently totally disabled. Subsection (iv) sets forth five specific criteria, which focus on
the injured worker, to assess whether the injured worker can perform other work reasonably
available. The Labor Commission promulgated an administrative rule that purports to permit
the consideration of additional factors, "location, stability, and wage rate of the work." (Br.
of Resps. at 1.). Because the administrative rule expands the statute, it is in conflict with
statutory law, and is therefore invalid.
McGee and the Labor Commission do not challenge any fact set forth by Petitioners.
(See Br. of Resps. at 4.) McGee sought permanent total disability benefits. Instead of
applying the statutory standard found in Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(c)(iv), the Labor
Commission applied Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C.
In the administrative proceeding, evidence was presented showing that there was
gainful work reasonably available to McGee. However, applying Administrative Rule R6121-lO.D.l.c. instead of the statute, the Commission concluded that McGee was entitled to
benefits because the wages for this gainful employment didn't pay enough.
I.

Standard of Review: Correctness
McGee and the Commission misstate the standard of review. McGee and the

Commission contend that this Court should concede discretion to the Commission in
deciding whether the administrative rule is consistent with the statute. (See Br. of Resps. at

1

2.) The Commission should not be granted deference on a matter of statutory interpretation.
Moreover, this Court should not be distracted away from the core issue that the
administrative rule conflicts with the statute by the efforts of McGee and the Commission
to move the focus onto the standard of review.
A.

Correctness: statutory interpretation and whether the administrative rule
conflicts with the statute

The proper standard of review is correctness. The administrative agency in this case,
the Labor Commission, is not in a better position than the Judiciary to determine whether an
administrative rule conflicts with legislation. Determining whether this Administrative Rule
conflicts with a state statute does not require specialized expertise by the Commission.
Indeed, this type of conflict between rule and statute is exactly the type of issue that courts
deal with on a regular basis. To defer to the Commission the power to decide if its own rule
conflicts with legislation would essentially result in handing over judicial review to the
Commission. Administrative rules are drafted and promulgated by the Commission with the
beliefthat they do not conflict with legislation. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-104(1)(2006)
(stating grant of authority to adopt rules in accordance with Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-l to -17 (2007) (Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act). If
this Court were to grant discretion to the Commission (the entity that promulgated the Rule
in the first place) to decide if the rule is consistent with legislation, this Court would
essentially cede judicial authority to the Commission.

2

In some cases, the court gives some deference to an administrative agency when the
agency's expertise is necessary to decide the issue.1 The issue in the instant proceeding,
however, is a classic judicial determination requiring no expertise - whether an
administrative rule conflicts with legislation. McGee and the Commission do nothing more
than claim that "[t]he Commission is well-suited to this responsibility because of its expertise
in modern employment relationships and its understanding of the workers' compensation
system." (Br. of Respondents at 5.) The determination of whether an administrative rule
conflicts with legislation is a pure question of law which does not require any specific agency
expertise.2 There is nothing about this issue requiring agency expertise that would merit an
abuse of discretion standard of review.
B.

No express or implied grant of discretion

Respondents cite no valid authority to support their contention that the Legislature
either explicitly or implicitly3 granted the Commission discretion to interpret Section 34A-2-

1

The abuse of discretion standard of review may also be warranted for factfinding
or application of the law to the facts. However, the instant case does not involve
factfinding, nor does the instant case involve application of the law to the facts. Rather,
the issue is purely a legal one: whether the administrative rule conflicts with a state
statute. This is a determination of law, not a factual finding or application of the law to
facts, and therefore the correctness standard must apply.
2

Moreover, the Labor Commission is not the State agency responsible for
vocational rehabilitation. That responsibility falls to the Division of Rehabilitation
Services. Therefore, the Commission has no expertise germane to whether the rule it
promulgated conflicts with legislation.
3

Although Respondents use the terms explicitly and implicitly, and the case law
uses the terms expressly and impliedly; Respondents see no legal distinction between the
terms, and Petitioners equate explicit with express and implicit with implied.
3

413(c)(iv). In fact, Utah authority is contrary to Respondents' assertions. The very
arguments McGee and the Commission make have already been rejected in Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus / Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, _ P.3d
_ , 4 and Esquivel v. Labor Comm' of Utah, 2000 UT 66. 7 P.3d 777. Utah law is clear that
in this circumstance, the Commission's decision must be reviewed under the correctness
standard.
McGee and the Commission's claim of impliedly-granted discretion pursuant to Utah
Code Section 413(l)(c)(iv) was rejected in Martinez. 2007 UT 42,

P.3d _ . McGee and

the Commission claim that Section 413(1 )(c)(iv) impliedly grants the Commission deference
on the issue because the statute contains the term "reasonably." (Br. of Resp. at 5, 8-10.)
However, in Martinez, the Utah Supreme Court explained that subsection 413(l)(c) "only
gives the Commission discretion to cfind' the facts required to establish the elements of
permanent total disability." Id. at f 44. Martinez also states, "We . . . hold that the language
of subsection (c) grants the Commission authority to determine only whether the facts
presented meet the statute's requirements for a finding of permanent total disability." Id. at
1142.5
4

Martinez was issued after Petitioners filed their opening brief

5

In Martinez the Utah Supreme Court makes broad statements regarding the
interpretation of Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l). These statements are made in the
context of considering, inter alia, who bears the burden of proof under Section 34A-2413(l)(c). Id at % 9. While the context of Martinez differs somewhat from the issue of
whether the administrative rule conflicts with the statute, the fact remains that the Utah
Supreme Court interpreted Section 34A-2-413(l)(c) in Martinez, and stated that the five
statutory factors are what must be considered in deciding whether work is reasonably
available. Id. at ^ 32 ("These factual considerations inform what is reasonable; its
4

Section 413(a)(c)(iv) does not impliedly grant any discretion to the Commission for
questions of law such as whether an administrative rule conflicts with a statute. The instant
issue is not one of factfinding, nor does the instant issue involve application of law to facts.
Rather, the issue is purely a legal one: whether the administrative rule conflicts with a state
statute. This is a determination of law, not a factual finding or application of law to facts.
Accordingly, Section 413(l)(c) does not impliedly grant the Commission discretion for
statutory interpretation.
McGee and the Labor Commission's claim of expressly-granted discretion pursuant
to Utah Code Section 34A-1-301, must also be rejected pursuant to EsquiveL 2000 UT 66,
7 P.3d 777, and Martinez. 2007 UT 42, _ P.3d _ . McGee and the Commission claim that
Section 34A-1-301 expressly grants the Commission deference because the statute "grants
the Commission cflill power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the
law in this chapter . . . ." (Br. of Resps. at 5, 8.) The claim for discretion based on this
statute was first rejected in Esquivel and affirmed in Martinez. In EsquiveL the court made
clear that "matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for
correctness." Id. at f 13 (brackets and citations omitted). The Esquivel court then clarified
that Section 34A-1-301 granted no deference to legal determinations, stating: "We have
never previously viewed [Section] 34A-1-301 as a broad grant of discretion to the Labor
Commission. In fact, we have, upon numerous occasions... reviewed commission decisions
parameters are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the case of
reasonable suspicion, for example."). The court also stated that it reviews the
"interpretation of section 34A-2-413(l)(c) for correctness," kL at f 46, and it declined to
cc
read[] additional terms into the statute," id. at ^j 53.
5

concerning questions of law under the correctness standard." Id at ^| 17 (citations omitted).
Then, Esquivel went on to reject the argument for discretion, stating, "We are not convinced,
and do not conclude, that section 34A-1-301 provides a general grant of discretion to the
Labor Commission for statutory interpretation." Id at f 18. Moreover, in the recent decision
of Martinez, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed what it previously held in Esquivel, "that
Section 34A-1-301 does not grant the Commission discretion for statutory interpretation."
Id at f 43. Section 34A-1-301 simply affords the Commission discretion to find facts and
apply facts to the proper law. Determining whether a rule promulgated by the Commission
conflicts with legislation merits no discretion, but must be reviewed for correctness.
In the end, this Court should not be distracted from the core issue that the
administrative rule conflicts with the statute by the efforts of McGee and the Commission
to direct the focus onto the standard of review.6 Utah law is clear that the proper standard
of review is correctness. As this Court is well aware, questions of statutory construction are
matters of law, and the court gives no deference to an administrative agency's interpretation
of a statute. Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Com'n. 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990).

6

Regardless, under either standard of review, for the reasons outlined in
Petitioners' opening brief and set forth below, the decision should be overturned as error;
and even if the abuse of discretion standard applied, the Commission's decision would
also rise to the level of an abuse of discretion.
6

II.

Statutory Construction: the administrative rule conflicts with the statute
Petitioners made clear in the opening brief that the instant petition presents an issue

of first impression, specifically whether Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-lO.D.l.c. is in
conflict with Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv). McGee and the Labor Commission
muddy the waters regarding the issue that is before the Court, and their interpretation of the
statute fails to consider all of the statutory language and give effect to each term.
A.

Construing the Statute to give effect to each term

McGee and the Commission's interpretation of the statute fails to take into
consideration all of the statutory language. When interpreting statutes, Utah courts "presume
that the Legislature used each term advisedly/' and thereby must construe statutes to give
effect to each term. See e.g.. State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8 4 10.44 P.3d 680. Because
Utah law presumes the Legislature used each term advisedly, all parts of the statute should
be harmonized so that all terms are relevant and meaningful according to their ordinary
meaning. It is a court's fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the
statute. See e.g., Martinez, 2007 UT 42 at f 46, _ P.3d _ .
McGee and the Commission read the statute to omit the language "taking into
consideration." They focus solely on the term "reasonably available.'' They claim the
Commission must merely consider whether work is reasonable available, ignoring the five
statutory factors as nothing more than suggestions that might be taken into consideration, and
promulgating a rule that permits consideration of other factors.

McGee and the

Commission's focus on "reasonableness" is demonstrated by their characterization of Rule

7

R612-1-10.D.1 as necessary "to interpret and apply [Utah Code Section] 413(l)(c)(iv)'s
'reasonableness' requirement." (Br. of Resps. at 1.) They further state that the Commission
must "determin[e] what 'reasonable' means," and that whether the administrative rule
conflicts with the statute "depends on the meaning of'reasonable' as the word is used in [the
statute]." (Br. of Respondents at 2.) However, the statutory language does not merely ask
the Commission to decide what is "reasonable." The statutory mandate to the Commission
is to evaluate whether "the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking
into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical
capacity, and residual functional capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2~413(c)(iv) (1997)
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Legislature has already defined what factors are to be
considered in determining whether other work is "reasonably available." Because the rule
avoids the statutory factors and purports to permit consideration of other non-statutory
factors, the rule expands on the statute and is improper and invalid.
Additionally, in Martinez the Utah Supreme Court stated that the five statutory factors
are what must be considered in deciding whether work is reasonably available. In discussing
the five statutory factors, the court stated, "These factual considerations inform what is
reasonable; its parameters are not further defined by an overarching legal principle, as in the
case of reasonable suspicion, for example." Id at f 32. In other words, Martinez directs that
whether work is reasonably available is determined by applying the five statutory factors, and
nothing else.

8

McGee and the Commission also read the statute to omit the language "the employee
cannot perform other work." Thus, by omitting consideration of this phrase and the five
statutory factors, their interpretation focuses almost exclusively on whether potential future
work is reasonable in light of its wage, shifting the focus away from the employee and his
or her ability to work. The statutory language, considers the employee, and whether "the
employee [can] perform . . . work," considering the employee's "age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." In other words, instead of
following the statutory language that keeps the employee's ability to work in mind, and
whether the employee is able to function; the Commission's misinterpretation leads it to
focus on future available work and what the work offers. A proper interpretation harmonizes
all of the phrases and terms of the statute. It is improper for McGee and the Commission to
consider solely whether future potential jobs are reasonable in light of an administrative rule
that considers whether the future potential jobs pay a wage greater than the state average
weekly wage. Rather, the full, harmonized reading of the statute requires greater focus on
the employee, specifically whether the individual can perform other work, taking into
consideration the employee's "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and
residual functional capacity."
McGee and the Commission over-generalize Petitioners' position, arguing that
Petitioners insist that the Commission has no discretion to consider anything outside of the
five statutory factors. (Br. of Resps. at 13.) Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) states what shall
be considered by the Labor Commission in determining whether an employee is permanently

9

totally disabled. While some considerations may exist within those factors, the so-called
"subsidiary considerations" alleged by McGee and the Commission are not statutory factors,
nor are they subsidiary considerations to the statutory factors.
The Labor Commission is statutorily mandated to evaluate whether "the employee
cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional
capacity." § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (emphasis added.) Within these five factors there may be
subsidiary considerations such as similarities or differences between an employee's past
work experiences, or changes over time in an employee's education, or changes over time
in medical capacity.

However, the statute makes no mention of the "subsidiary

considerations" claimed by Respondents - gross income, wage rates, or the state average
weekly wage; the subsidiary considerations characterized by McGee and the Commission
as "location, stability, and wage rate of the work." (See Br. of Resps. at 1 ("location,
stability, and wage rate of the work"; 5-6 ("1) the stability and regularity of the work; 2) the
work's location; and 3) the wage attached to the work"; 13 "1) stability, 2) location, and 3)
wage").) Because Administrative Rule R612-1 -10.D. 1 .c purports to permit consideration of
these additional factors, it impermissibly expands the statute, shifting the focus away from
the injured worker and onto possible future work, and is therefore invalid.
McGee and the Commission appear to abandon the position they took in the
administrative proceeding. In its final order, the Appeals Board reasoned that Administrative
Rule R612-1-10.D.1 took "a broad[] view of the statutory term 'past work experience.'"

10

(Order of Dec. 29, 2006, at p.3.) The Commission reasoned that the term "past work
experience" permitted consideration of other aspects besides work experiences or duties,
including "the location of the injured worker's residence,... previous wage levels, and the
availability and regularity of alternative work." (Id.)

The Commission's reasoning must

be rejected. The consideration of past work experience does not permit consideration of
current wages. The evaluation of how the potential wage of potential future employment
compares to the current state average weekly wage does not take into account any aspect of
past wages, much less "past work experience."
The Legislature used the term "past work experience" advisedly. The term "past"
does not imply in any way the consideration of current available wages, nor does it suggest
consideration of the "current state average weekly wage." Utah Admin. Code R R612-1lO.D.l.c. (2007). The consideration of "past work experience" also does not suggest
consideration of wages. Experience is defined as "practical knowledge, skill, or practice
derived from direct observation of or participation in events or in a particular activity [;] the
length of such participation <has 10 years [experience] in the job>." (See "Experience,"
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1993)). If the Legislature had wanted to
permit consideration of wages in conjunction with consideration of experience, it would have
said so. It did not.
McGee and the Labor Commission tacitly admit that the Commission considered three
non-statutory factors. McGee and the Commission acknowledge that "[t]he Commission
promulgated Rule R612-1-10.D.1 to identify the subsidiary considerations . . . .

11

These

[subsidiary] considerations include the location, stability, and wage rate of the work." (Br.
of Respondents at 1; see also 5-6,13.) Nowhere in the statute does the Legislature state that
the Commission is to consider "location, stability, and wage rate of the work." Rather, the
Legislature directs the Commission to "tak[e] into consideration the employee's age,
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." The
alleged factors of "location, stability, and wage rate of the work,"are not statutory factors.
Moreover, they are not "subsidiary" to the five statutory factors of age, education, past work
experience, medical capacity, or residual functional capacity.
Any claim that the additional factors of "location, stability, and wage rate of the
work,"are "subsidiary considerations" to the statutory factors has no merit. The location of
possible future work cannot be a "subsidiary factor" of age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. Location of future work is not a secondary
consideration that must be taken into account in evaluating the employee's age, education,
past work experience, medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. The stability of
possible future work cannot be a "subsidiary factor" of age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. Whether future work is likely to be
constant or consistent does not flow from evaluating the employee's age, education, past
work experience, medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. The wage rate of
possible future work cannot be a "subsidiary factor" of age, education, past work experience,
medical capacity, or residual functional capacity. How much a potential future job pays, and
whether the wage is greater than the state average weekly wage, is not a secondary

12

consideration to an employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, or
residual functional capacity. Moreover, read in context of one another, the statutory factors
all point to consideration of the employee's health and past work experience. Consideration
of purported "subsidiary factors" that relate to possible future work and the wage rate of that
work cannot reasonably be considered subsidiary or secondary to the statutory factors.
McGee and the Commission fail to acknowledge that the Labor Commission has no
inherent authority apart from the legislative grant.

All powers, rights, duties, and

responsibilities of the Utah Labor Commission are granted by the Utah Legislature. Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-1-103 (1997). The statutory language is clear: The Labor Commission
is statutorily mandated by Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) to evaluate whether "the employee
cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional
capacity." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis added). The Commission
is a creature of statute and must comply with the statutory mandate or seek modification of
the statute with the Legislature.
B.

The administrative rule conflicts with the statute

The administrative rule is invalid because it conflicts with the statute. "It is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its
governing statutes." Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n,
846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993). An administrative rule that is out of harmony with a
statute is invalid. Id.

13

Because Administrative Rule 612-1-1 O.D.I is out of harmony with Section 34A-2413(l)(c)(iv), the rule is invalid.

The statute's plain language does not provide for

consideration of "location, stability, and wage rate of the work"; and the Commission's
application of the rule also impermissibly expands the statute.
1.

Plain language

Comparing the plain language of the statute with the administrative rule, the
administrative rule sets forth additional considerations beyond the five statutory criteria. The
statutory language reads, in relevant part:
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled,.. .
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available,
taking into consideration the employee's [1] age, [2] education, [3] past
work experience, [4] medical capacity, and [5] residual functional
capacity.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(c)(iv) (1997) (emphasis and brackets added).
Administrative Code R612-1-10.D reads as follows:
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and definitions apply:
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a
claimant if such work meets the following criteria:
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the
claimant's community would consider to be a typical or acceptable
commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was traveling
to work prior to his or her accident;
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to:
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of
the accident the claimant was earning more than the state
average weekly wage then in effect; or

14

Utah

(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the
accident, if the employee was earning less than the state
average weekly wage then in effect.
Utah Admin. Code R612-1 -10.D. 1 .c (2007) (emphasis added.) If the Legislature had wanted
to permit consideration of wages in conjunction with consideration of experience, it would
have said so. It did not. Or if it had wanted to permit consideration of other factors, it would
have said "taking into consideration, among other things, the employee's

" Again, it did

not. Accordingly, from a straightforward textual analysis, the administrative rule improperly
expands the statute and must be invalidated by this Court.
2.

Utah case law

McGee and the Commission acknowledge that the Commission's application of the
rule included the analysis of purported "subsidiary considerations"- "location, stability, and
wage rate of the work." This is an improper application.
In attempting to distract this Court away from whether the administrative rule
conflicts with the statute and onto the standard of review, McGee and the Commission
contend that three cases cited by Petitioners are inapplicable: Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit
Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993); Draughon v. Dep't of
Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 93 5 (Utah App. 1999), and Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 762 P.2d 1119 (Utah App. 1988). McGee and the Commission claim that these cases
do not apply because they do not involve a situation in which the administrative agency was
granted discretion to interpret the statute. (Br. of Resps. at 10.) This argument fails.

15

First, Respondents' claim of inapplicability makes little sense. McGee and the
Commission argue that the cases are inapplicable because they apply the correctness standard
of review rather than the abuse of discretion standard, allegedly because there was no grant
of discretion.7 As noted above, abuse of discretion is not the correct standard of review.
Therefore, the cases cited by Petitioners are applicable because they apply the proper
standard of review - correctness.
Second, the cases are applicable and good law.

Sanders Brine Shrimp and Draughon

both hold that administrative rules which depart from statutory terms impermissibly modify
the statute. Crowther articulates the longstanding Utah law that administrative regulations
may not conflict with legislation.
In Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, the Utah
Supreme Court invalidated an administrative rule that improperly defined who was entitled
to a tax exemption.

Instead of setting forth and applying the statutory criteria, the

"Commission relied upon an administrative rule that impermissibly narrowed the availability
of the exemptions." IdL at 1304. In Draughon v. Dep't of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT
App 42, 975 P.2d 935, a civil service worker was reassigned pursuant to an administrative
rule permitting "involuntary reassignments." Id at f 1. The "involuntary reassignment" as
defined by the administrative rule violated the statutory prohibition against "demotions." Id,

Respondents fail to note in their reliance on Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div.,
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), that the Court relied on the correctness-of-error standard based
on well established principles of statutory construction, which applies here to the
unambiguous statute. Id. at 589.
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at f5. This Court invalidated the rule because it purported to create new administrative
criteria different from the statute. Id. Crowther simply states longstanding Utah law that an
agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes, and that an administrative rule
that is out of harmony with a statute is invalid. 762 P.2d at 1122. There is nothing about the
issuance of the Crowther opinion "prior to the 'standard of review' jurisprudence
subsequently articulated [in other cases]" that invalidates this longstanding law.
These cases require invalidation of Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.I.e. The
administrative rule, both on its face and as applied by the Commission, improperly modifies
the statutory factors. The five statutory factors for evaluating what constitutes "other work
reasonably available," include "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and
residual functional capacity." The administrative rule purports to permit the consideration
of gross income, current available wage rates, or the current state average weekly wage factors that Respondents themselves characterize as "subsidiary considerations" of "location,
stability, and wage rate of the work." (Br. of Resps. at 1, 13.) The administrative rule is
invalid because it enlarges the statutory criteria and thereby improperly modifies the statute.
C.

The Labor Commission's argument is more properly made to the
Legislature

The Labor Commission's position that it should be able to consider these additional
factors is properly submitted to the Legislature as an attempt to change the statute. See, e.g.,
Color Country Mgmt v. Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, f43, 38 P.3d 969 (stating in
context of denial of argument for additional procedures and considerations, that the
petitioner's arguments "are best directed to the Legislature"); Rekward v. Industrial Comm'n
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ofUtah, 755 P.2d 166,169 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating in context of denial of benefits due
that "[although we sympathize with [the applicant's] unfortunate situation, the problem must
be solved by the legislature and not this Court."). If the Labor Commission wants to consider
the stability of possible future work, the work's location, and the wage attached to the
possible future work, the Labor Commission should persuade the Legislature to have these
factors enacted as statutory considerations.
D.

Claiming benefits and asserting the purpose of the Workers
Compensation Act is to provide benefits to injured workers does not
satisfy the requirements of the Act

McGee and the Commission claim that the administrative rule is consistent with the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act because the rule supports a societal purpose of the Act providing compensation to injured workers. (Br. of Resps. at 11-12.) Although providing
compensation to injured workers may be a general purpose of the Act, providing
compensation is not automatic for each case. This argument, that the injured employee
should recover because the workers' compensation system is meant to provide compensation
to injured employees, could be made in any workers compensation proceeding; and if it were
adopted, the requirements of the Act would have no meaning.
This over-simplified position fails to acknowledge, however, that before the employee
may receive workers' compensation benefits, the employee must satisfy the requirements of
the workers' compensation system. An employee does not simply make a claim, which then
requires an employer or insurer to write out a check for the claimed benefits simply because
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the workers' compensation system is meant to compensate injured employees. The employee
must satisfy the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act.8
In the instant case, Respondents maintain that McGee does not satisfy the
requirements of the Act for obtaining permanent total disability benefits. The award of these
benefits was improper because the Administrative Rule applied by the Labor Commission
in awarding the benefits is invalid; it conflicts with state legislation. The ALJ held that
available, gainful employment was unacceptable solely because the jobs did not pay enough
money - they did not provide a wage at or above the current State average weekly wage that
Rule 612-1-10.D.1 purports to require. The statute, however, permits consideration of age,
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity; it does
not provide for consideration of gross income, available wage rates, or the current State
average weekly wage. Therefore, the Rule improperly expands the statute. As indicated by
the ALJ, the jobs identified were appropriate given McGee's work injury (residual functional

8

In fact, the policy and purpose of returning workers to the workforce can be used
to support Petitioners' position. Rejecting gainful employment because it pays less than
the current state average weekly wage is contrary to the policy and purpose of returning
citizens to the workforce. Utah Code Section 34A-8-102 states that the Utah Injured
Worker Reemployment Act "is intended to promote and . . . assist the injured worker in
returning to the work force as quickly as possible." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-8-102 (1997).
Section 34A-2-413(6)(a)(i) specifically states that reemployment activities are to be
undertaken "pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act." The
Petitioner's argument that the difference between the standards governing the first and
second step proceedings cannot be confused also lacks support. On its face, the argument
makes no sense that different standards would apply to two steps in the same process.
However, the subsistence benefits, on which Petitioners rely, cease upon a return to
gainful employment. Therefore, those benefits do not justify a different standard.
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capacity) and his transferable skills (past work experience). The only deficiency identified
by the ALJ was the lower wage provided by these jobs. Because the Commission lacks
authority to enact and rely on a Rule that expands the statute, the award of permanent total
disability benefits must be overturned.

Just because the Act's purpose is to secure

compensation for injured employees does not mean that McGee has satisfied the
requirements of the Act, or that the Labor Commission did not err.
E.

The Commission's error in applying the invalid administrative rule and
failure to apply the statutory factors has been raised all along

McGee and the Commission attempt to avoid the fact that the Commission's orders
(both from the ALJ and the Appeals Board) failed to set forth and apply the statutory factors;
they claim failure to set forth and apply the statutory factors was never raised in the
administrative proceeding. (Br. of Resps. at 16-17.) This argument fails for two reasons.
First, Petitioners maintained all along through the administrative proceeding that the
Commission applied the wrong law (an invalid rule) and, therefore, failed to apply the
statutory factors. The Court should not be misguided into thinking that the issue was not
raised in the administrative proceeding.

It comes as no surprise to McGee and the

Commission that Petitioners argue that the Commission failed to apply the proper statutory
criteria. However, McGee and the Commission attempt to avoid the issue by claiming that
the language and authority used in the opening brief was not part of the administrative
Motion for Review. (Br. of Resps. at 16, quoting Opening Br. of Petitioners at 17-18.) The
fact of the matter is that Petitioners identified legal authority to this Court to support their
position for which Respondents have no response other than to attempt to avoid the issue.
20

The fact that Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986), was not cited to the
Appeals Board does not mean that the issue of applying an invalid rule instead of the proper
statutory factors was not raised. The argument that the Commission failed to apply the
statutory factors was raised all along.
In Norton, the Industrial Commission's ruling was invalidated because it failed to set
forth and apply the proper statutory factors. Id. at 1026, 28. At the time, to determine
whether a worker was permanently, totally disabled, the Commission was required to
consider the worker's age, sex, education, economic and social environment, and medical
impairment. Id. at 1027. The Commission "failed... to carry out its task" because it failed
to apply the required criteria. Id. The Labor Commission failed to set forth and apply the
proper factors in the instant case.
Second, even if the Court is inclined to believe that the ALJ's failure to apply the
statutory criteria was not raised to the Appeals Board, the Appeals Board's failure to set forth
and apply the statutory criteria is properly raised to this Court. The Appeals Board is the
ultimate finder of fact in this case. See, e.g.. Carter v. Labor Comm'n Appeals Board, 2006
UT App 477, f 16,153 P.3d 763. Therefore, this appeal is Petitioners' first and only chance
of addressing deficiencies in the Appeals Board's Order. Instead of applying the statutory
factors, the Appeals Board simply defended the decision to follow the administrative rule.
(R. 0201.) In so doing, the Appeals Board failed to apply the statutory criteria. Because of
this, Norton requires the Commission's order to be reversed. This Court should not permit
McGee and the Commission to sidestep this authority.
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F.

Other portions of the Administrative Rule have been invalidated

McGee and the Commission complain that Petitioners reminded the Court that
subsection C of Administrative Rule R612-1-10 has already been invalidated. McGee and
the Commission claim that this Court has "withdrawn support" from Target Trucking v.
Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 70, ^[6,108 P.3d 128, and that Petitioner's reference to it
is "misleading." (Br. of Respondents at 17-18.) This argument has no merit.
Petitioners cited Target Trucking to remind the Court that: (1) an administrative
body's rules must conform to, rather than be inconsistent with, statute; and (2) subsection C
of the administrative rule at issue has already been invalidated. In Target Trucking, this
Court concluded that Administrative Rule 612-1-10.C.1 .c was invalid because it conflicted
with the statute.9 Id. at Tff 3-6. There is nothing "misleading" about citing this case.
Petitioners explained in their opening brief why the claim that "this Court has
withdrawn support from the Target decision" is erroneous. Any disagreement with Target
Trucking has to do with when an agency action is final. Petitioners explained in their
opening brief:
. . . [Ameritemps. Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 491, 128 P.3d 31]
noted that while Target Trucking was correct in the general rule requiring the
invalidation of an administrative rule that conflicts with legislation, the Target
Trucking opinion failed to apply the three-part test adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT
40, ^[16,999 P.2d 17, to determine when an agency action is final. Regardless

9

The administrative rule stated that a preliminary determination of permanent
total disability was a final agency action for purposes of appellate review, while the
statute stated that such a finding was not a final action for purposes of appellate review
unless agreed to by the parties or until a reemployment plan was considered.
22

of any confusion as to the standard for determining whether an agency action
is final, the specific holding of Target Trucking remains clear: the
administrative rule in Target Trucking was properly invalidated because
administrative rules must conform to, rather than be inconsistent with statutes,
and when an administrative rule conflicts with a statute, the rule must yield to
the statute."
(Opening Br. of Petitioners at 25, n. 3.) Target Trucking was not overturned; it is still good
law for the proposition that when an administrative rule conflicts with a statute, the rule must
yield to the statute. The only issue with Target Trucking is that it failed to apply the threepart test of Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT 40, f 16, 999 P.2d 17,
a test that is inapplicable to the instant case. Thus, Respondents' allegations that Target
Trucking is inapplicable or misleading are simply unfounded and without merit.
CONCLUSION
Instead of applying the statutory standard found in Utah Code Section 34A-2413(c)(iv) which sets forth statutory criteria that must be analyzed and applied in evaluating
whether an employee is permanently disabled, the Labor Commission applied Utah
Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1.C.

This Administrative Rule purports to permit

consideration of factors beyond the statutory factors, and therefore conflicts with the
statutory standard. The Administrative Rule must be invalidated because it goes beyond the
statutory mandate.
Accordingly, the Labor Commission's determination of permanent total disability
must be reversed. Additionally, the Utah Administrative Rule R612-1-10.D.1 must be
declared invalid as an impermissible amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act.
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